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ESSAY 
SOME LESSONS ABOUT THE LAW FROM 
SELF-REFERENTIAL PROBLEMS IN 
MATHEMATICS 
John M. Rogers* and Robert E. Molzon ** 
If systems of law can be analogized to axiomatic systems of mathe-
matical logic in a tight enough fashion, then some conclusions of twen-
tieth-century mathematicians regarding number theory systems may 
usefully be applied to legal systems as well. In particular, legal theo-
rists must become comfortable with the incompleteness of legal sys-
tems, no matter how carefully constructed, in the same way that 
mathematicians and philosophers have become comfortable with the 
incompleteness of axiomatic systems of number theory. The analogy 
sheds light on some currently perceived problems with our constitu-
tional system. 
We first describe briefly mathematician Kurt Godel's brilliant In-
completeness Theorem of 1931, and explore some of its general impli-
cations. We then attempt to draw a parallel between axiomatic 
systems of number theory (or oflogic in general) and systems of law, 
and defend the analogy against anticipated objections. Finally, we 
reach two types of conclusions. First, failure to distinguish between 
language and metalanguage in mathematical self-referential problems 
leads to fallacies that are highly analogous to certain legal fallacies. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, Godel's theorem strongly sug-
gests that it is impossible to create a legal system that is "complete" in 
the sense that there is a derivable rule for every fact situation. It fol-
lows that criticisms of constitutional systems for failure to determine 
every answer are unfair: they demand more than any legal system can 
give. At best they are antilegal in the sense that rejection of such con-
stitutional systems on such a ground would require the rejection of all 
constitutional systems. 
• Brown, Todd & Heyburn Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1970, Stanford; 
J.D. 1974, Michigan. - Ed. I would like to thank David Bryden, Alvin Goldman, Michael 
Hoffheimer, and Peter Suber for making helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay, 
•• Professor of Mathematics, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1973, University of Kentucky; 
Ph.D. 1977, Johns Hopkins University. - Ed. I would like to thank the National Science Foun· 
dation for partial support of this research. 
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I. SELF-REFERENCE AND GODEL'S THEOREM 
Consider the following sentence. 
This sentence is false. 
993 
If we think about the preceding sentence, we have difficulty ascer-
taining whether it is true or false - a quixotic, perhaps wasteful, en-
deavor. But thinking about the very difficulty of ascertaining whether 
the sentence is true or false may provide some interesting insights. 
The paradox stems from the self-referential nature of the sentence. 
The sentence says something about itself. Of course a sentence can say 
something about itself and be easily determined either true or false. 
For instance: 
This sentence has five words. 
But intuition suggests that if an expression can refer to itself, a 
seeming paradox can be constructed. For instance: 
I am lying. 
Every assertion in this article is misleading. 
This statement cannot be proved true. 1 
It is possible that every consistent system of statements that is expres-
sive enough to include self-referential statements includes some state-
ments that tum on themselves in this way - statements that cannot 
be proved true or false within the system. 
Number theory has been used to examine whether consistent sys-
tems always include undecidable propositions. Number theory is the 
branch of mathematics dealing with relationships between integers. In 
a particular "system," propositions must be expressed in a certain 
way, and a particular set of axioms (assumed truths) and rules is used 
to generate a set of properly expressed statements that are "true." 
From a limited number of axioms, the number theorist - like the 
mathematician generally - develops (proves) other statements 
(theorems). 
In 1931 German number theorist Kurt Godel did a revolutionary 
thing. He proved that if a number theory system's set of axioms is 
complex enough to include simple arithmetic, then there are true 
statements within the system that cannot be reached using the axioms 
and rules of the system. In other words, he proved that such systems 
have formally undecidable propositions. 2 He did this by demonstrat-
1. This last example is perhaps true, but somewhat difficult to prove! 
2. Kurt Godel, Uber formal unentscheidbare Siitze der Principia Mathematica und ver-
wandter Systeme l 38 MONATSHEFTE FOR MATHEMATIK UND PHYSIK 173-98 (1931), trans-
lated in KURT GODEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA 
MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS (B. Meltzer trans., 1962). 
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ing that self-referential statements of number theory could be ex-
pressed within such number theory systems, and that indeed a self-
referential statement could always be expressed that was unprovable in 
the same way that 
This sentence cannot be proved. 
cannot be proved. 
Giidel and the Paradox of Self-Reference 
In this section we elaborate on some of the problems and ideas 
connected with self-reference, and then briefly explain how Godel suc-
cessfully analyzed one particular type of self-reference. By discussing 
self-reference in the abstract setting of logic before considering legal 
self-reference problems, we hope to present the underlying problem 
free of legal aspects that might tend to conceal the more fundamental 
difficulties. 
The "liar's paradox" (as in "I am lying") is actually quite old. It 
appears in Paul's Letter to Titus. 3 Epimenides the Cretan is reported 
to have said, "All Cretans are liars."4 This statement presents a para-
dox because Epimenides himself was a Cretan and the statement was 
taken to mean that every statement by a Cretan is false. 5 
The Epimenides paradox is an example of a semantic self-referen-
tial statement in which an assertion in some way refers to itself. A 
discussion of semantic self-reference must first distinguish between 
formal language and metalanguage - languages that are both usually 
present in mathematical logic. Statements made in the formal lan-
guage are expressed in the symbols of the language following the for-
mation rules of the language. The metalanguage, on the other hand, is 
the language used to describe the rules, symbols, and statements of the 
formal language. The formal language should not be considered in 
some sense better than the metalanguage. The two languages may use 
the same symbols or not. For example, the rules of syntax of English 
are themselves written in English. 
An example might help explain the distinction. Suppose we take 
the game of chess as our formal language; it exists in the form of the 
board, the pieces, and the rules for moving the pieces. The 
3. Titus 1:12. 
4. DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE EssBNCB OF 
MIND AND PATTERN 7 (1985). 
5. Even so taken, the statement could be nonparadoxical if we simply conclude that it is false, 
on the assumption that some other Cretan statement is true. J.L. MACKIE, TRUTH, 
PROBABILITY, AND PARADOX 276 (1973). The necessity of the assumption demonstrates logical 
problems with this resolution. Id. at 276-85. The problem is presented more purely by the sim-
ple statement, "This statement is a lie." 
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metalanguage will be English and we may use English to describe the 
functions of the pieces and the rules. Now suppose we hypothesize a 
certain position from which White can mate Black in five moves. One 
could "prove" this possibility by moving the pieces and thus demon-
strating that mate is indeed always possible in five moves. Since Black 
has only a finite number of possible moves after any move of White, 
one could actually carry out this proof, although it would obviously be 
very cumbersome. Alternatively, one could describe in words the 
moves White must make to force mate in five moves. Each of these 
proofs is equally valid and, in this case, the metalanguage proof is in 
some respects better than the formal language proof. 
Now we describe the paradox, Richard's Paradox, that eventually 
led Godel to one of his main results. 6 Suppose we take simple arith-
metic, with the operations of addition and multiplication, as our for-
mal language, and we begin to make a list of arithmetic statements, 
such as what it means for a number to be even or prime. Next we label 
our list so that each definition, statement, and property is assigned a 
number. Our labeling system thus serves as a metalanguage because it 
is a system that refers to the formal language. 
We now make a definition. A number shall be called "Richar-
dian" if it does not satisfy the property it describes. For example, sup-
pose the definition of an even number is labeled 5. The 5 is Richardian 
because it is not even. On the other hand, suppose the definition of 
prime number7 is labeled 13. Then 13 would not be Richardian be-
cause it does satisfy the definition of prime. The definition of a 
Richardian number must appear somewhere on our list and it must be 
labeled with some number, which we shall refer to as r. Is this number 
r Richardian or not? Some thought should convince the reader that 
the number r is Richardian if and only if it is not Richardian. This is 
Richard's Paradox. 
The logical difficulty with Richard's Paradox is that the formal 
language and the metalanguage have been confused. The formal lan-
guage is the language of arithmetic and the metalanguage is the label-
ing system. The property "Richardian" is not an arithmetic property; 
it is not a property of numbers with the operations of addition and 
multiplication. Rather, it is a property that depends on the 
metalanguage. In this case a solution to the paradox is found in the 
realization that the two languages have been mixed. 
6. This version of Richard's Paradox is drawn substantially from ERNEST NAGEL & JAMES 
R. NEWMAN, GoDEL'S PROOF 60-63 (1958). Indeed, Nagel and Newman's admirable book 
supports much of the following description of Giidel's proof. 
7. A number is prime if it is divisible only by itself and 1. 
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Now we consider Godel's approach to self-reference. As Richard's 
Paradox illustrates, mixing a formal language with its metalanguage 
poses fundamental difficulties. One of Godel's accomplishments was 
demonstrating that a formal language, arithmetic, could serve as its 
own metalanguage. He did this by describing a correspondence be-
tween statements in arithmetic and statements in the metalanguage. 
In fact, Godel described this relationship so precisely that one can 
think of it as a machine that, when given a metamathematical state-
ment as input, churns out a mathematical statement. The machine 
can also run in reverse, so that if one plugs in a mathematical state-
ment, out pops the corresponding metamathematical statement. 
Once this machine was constructed, Godel formulated a special, 
and somewhat complicated, arithmetic relationship, which we shall re-
fer to as G. If the arithmetic relationship is plugged into the machine 
(running in reverse), the machine produces the following 
metamathematical statement: 
The formula G cannot be derived in the language of arithmetic. 
It should now be apparent why formula G is so special: the corre-
sponding metamathematical statement referred to G itself! Note that 
we have said nothing about the truth or falsity of G. It is simply a 
well-formed statement to be understood as we understand a sentence 
that is grammatically correct without judging the truth of the 
meaning. 
The formula G has another significant property, however. If one 
could derive G by a sequence of valid arithmetic statements, then the 
negation of G could be derived. But one cannot derive both a state-
ment and its negation if arithmetic is consistent. Hence G cannot be 
derived. Therefore the metamathematical statement "The formula G 
cannot be derived in the language of arithmetic" must be a true state-
ment. The inescapable conclusion: G is true but it cannot be derived. 
In other words, the concepts of truth and derivation are not at all 
equivalent. This may not come as a surprise to a lawyer, but it cer-
tainly was a shock to mathematicians. 8 
Godel's theorem can be applied to any consistent system that is 
expressive enough to serve as its own metalanguage.9 His theorem has 
8. To understand the significance of what G&lel proved, one must keep in mind that it is not 
at all surprising that arithmetic contains a statement about numbers which cannot be derived 
from axioms. The surprise comes from the proof that arithmetic contains a true statement that 
cannot be derived. 
9. Many texts state and prove Godel's result on incompleteness in the language of an arith· 
metic containing the operations of addition and multiplication. This is an example of a "first 
order" language in which quantification is allowed only on individual variables. In dealing with 
a legal system, we are concerned with incompleteness in higher order languages. In fact, Godel's 
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enormous significance for the way in which we, as reasoning humans, 
look at meaning and truth. The significance lies not only in Godel's 
conclusion, but also in the way that the conclusion was reached. In a 
remarkable book, Professor Douglas Hofstadter has made Godel's rea-
soning, as well as the fundamental significance of it, intuitively accessi-
ble to those of us who do not think about number theory every day. 10 
Hofstadter showed that the genius reflected in Godel's proof is in 
astonishing ways mirrored in the music of Johann Sebastian Bach and 
in the drawings of M.C. Escher. Hofstadter also explored a broad 
range of areas of intellectual endeavor where ideas reflected in Godel's 
proof provide insight, from grammar and translation of foreign lan-
guages to molecular biology and artificial intelligence. One is left with 
the realization that problems associated with self-reference tell us 
something significant about the meaning of "truth" and the extent to 
which truth exists (or can be proved). 
II. A LEGAL ANALOGY TO GODEL 
Perhaps we can derive comparable insights about the law. To 
draw conclusions about legal systems from Godel's discovery, we need 
to analogize legal systems to axiomatic systems. This essay attempts 
to do so. 11 First, we show how law can be looked at as a system. We 
then analogize "truth" in logic to "the law" in legal analysis. Finally, 
we assume that consistency, properly understood, is as essential to law 
as it is to axiomatic systems. 
A. The Law as a System 
At first it may seem implausible to think about "the law" as some-
thing that can be examined for precise characteristics in the way that a 
system of number theory or a microbiological process can. We all 
know that laws change from time to time, they come from various 
sources, they conflict, and their application depends on the whims of 
all sorts of people of varying degrees of intelligence, honesty, and 
interest. 
At a high level of abstraction, however, it is easy to describe the 
incompleteness result holds in any (higher order) language which is expressive enough to de-
scribe arithmetic with addition and multiplication. This would include almost any language 
which is complex enough to describe a legal system. See, e.g., C. Smorynski, The Incompleteness 
Theorems, in HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL Lome 821, 825-29 (Jon Barwise ed., 1977). 
10. See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, EsCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN 
BRAID (1979). 
11. The analogy has been suggested elsewhere, notably in DANIEL KORNSTEIN, THE MUSIC 
OF THE LAWS 124-28 (1982), and John M. Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in 
the Concept of Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 195, 224-29 (1980). 
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law as a system. A legal rule merely is a statement that if certain 
actions or circumstances are found to exist or to have existed, a certain 
action (or inaction) will be required (or permitted, or not required, or 
not permitted) by whatever force supports the requirement. For in-
stance, one such statement might be: if a citizen earns $50,000 in 
1990, he must pay the government $10,000 in taxes. Another might 
be: if anyone drives a vehicle on Main Street, she may not drive faster 
than thirty-five miles per hour. Or: if anyone intentionally rapes a 
minor, he will be hanged. Or: when someone has a duty of care and 
violates that duty, thereby proximately causing injury to another, she 
must pay the victim an amount equal to his injury. Thus we have a 
well-defined form for a statement of law. 
B. "The Law" Analogized to "Truth" 
We must be careful in analogizing between legal systems and axio-
matic systems of logic. 12 For instance, if we evaluate a statement in 
logic for "truth," then what is the value for which legal statements are 
evaluated? Asked differently, what does it mean to say that a rule of 
law is "true"? In Euclidean geometry it was possible to test certain 
theorems for truth by checking them against objective reality. Within 
the limits of measurement, for instance, all right triangles conform to 
the Pythagorean Theorem. One of the axioms or fundamental as-
sumptions of Euclidean geometry is that if there is a point outside of a 
line, only one line parallel to the first line can be drawn through the 
point. In the nineteenth century, mathematicians developed a "non-
Euclidean" geometry - including a whole collection of theorems and 
corollaries - in which multiple parallel lines were assumed to be able 
to pass through the point. Perhaps one reason that non-Euclidean ge-
ometry developed so recently was that there was no obvious way of 
checking its theorems against objective reality. This makes the theo-
rems no less "true" (assuming all of the relevant axioms), but the 
meaning of "true" may be a little different for some. Truth may just 
mean "consistent with all other axioms and proven and provable 
theorems." 
One perhaps overly positivistic analogue to truth when speaking 
about law is what a court with jurisdiction would decide if presented 
with the case. Just because no court has resolved or will resolve a 
12. We do not argue that Jaw is a calculus in the way that Roy Stone has. See Roy L. Stone· 
de Montpensier, The Comp/eat Wrangler, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1001 (1966); Roy L. Stone, Affi11i· 
ties a11d Antinomies i11 Jurisprudence, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 281-85. We are only identify. 
ing some commonalities between consistent systems of laws and other consistent systems of 
propositions. 
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dispute between two parties obviously does not mean that there is no 
law. Even before there is a dispute, there can be law. But the most 
accurate definition of law is often in ultimate practical terms what the 
lawyer thinks the legal system will allow or require. Just like geomet-
ric theorems that only occasionally may be verified by mapping onto 
spatial reality, legal truth may only occasionally be pinned down by a 
court decision. But the whole body of legal results consistent with 
those decisions may be said to constitute what is law.13 The lawyer 
who advises on the law is in effect saying what a court would hold if it 
were to decide the issue.14 To a large extent this is what we mean 
when we say, "The law is .... " 
C. Consistency 
If the law can be compared to a body of correspondences between 
fact situations and results, only some of which are represented by 
court decisions, in what sense can it be said that the correspondences 
are consistent with each other? Stated otherwise, do the rules of law 
produce consistent results? In logic it is fundamental that a statement 
and its negation cannot both be true. A hypothesis is disproved, for 
instance, by demonstrating that the hypothesis necessarily implies 
both X and not-.X. A system of statements could be invented in which 
both X and not-X are true, but it could soon be proved that all state-
ments in the system are true, and the system would not be of much 
use. 15 
Similarly, a system of law in which a statement in the form of a 
rule is both a rule of law and not a rule of law would not be very 
13. More precisely but more abstractly, we should talk not of "courts" but of legitimate 
decisionmaking authority. A legal system can exist without courts, but there has to be someone 
to apply the law sometime. Even in a legal system where there is no superior enforcement au-
thority, such as the public international legal system, cases are "decided" in a sense. The interna-
tional legal system can be described as a system of reciprocal entitlements, and that system can 
be examined for "cases" in which disputes are resolved. See Anthony D' Amato, Is International 
Law Really '7.aw"?, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1293 (1985). 
14. Compare Ronald Dworkin's somewhat more subjective definition: "A proposition oflaw 
may be asserted as true if it is more consistent with the theory of law that best justifies settled law 
than the contrary proposition of law." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 283 
(1977) (emphasis added). But see H.L.A. Hart's criticism of the definition of law as simply a 
prediction of what courts will hold. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138-44 (1961). 
15. See, e.g .• NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 50-51; RAYMOND SMULLYAN, FOREVER 
UNDECIDED: A PUZZLE GUIDE TO GODEL 57-58 (1987). 
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useful. 16 It contradicts the very way we think about law.11 How can 
.some action be required in certain circumstances, if the same action is 
also not required in identical circumstances? When explaining stare 
decisis to first-year law students, one of us sometimes says that "con-
sistency may be the hobgoblin of little minds, but it is the glory of the 
law." Perhaps it is more accurate to say that consistency is essential to 
thinking about law. 
Once while teaching tort law, one of us tried to get a student to 
distinguish two cases decided in opposite ways. After some initial at-
tempts that did not hold up, the student agreed for the sake of argu-
ment that the facts of the two cases were not distinguishable in any 
relevant way. He nonetheless continued to maintain that both cases 
were decided correctly. "Why should we let logic get in the way of 
fair results?" he asked. This is a discussion-stopper. If identical cases 
can be decided correctly in inconsistent ways, there is not much left to 
the inquiry into what the law is. That such a question is a discussion-
stopper shows the extent to which consistency is built into the very 
nature of the way we think about law. Of course, the student may 
have meant only that a superficial or seeming logic should not inter-
fere with reliance upon distinctions that can be felt but that are diffi-
cult to articulate. If so, the discussion is still hard to continue, as 
inarticulable distinctions are hard to talk about, but at least the under-
lying assumption of consistency is preserved. 
Moreover, the many ways in which lawyers are accustomed to 
talking about "inconsistency" in the law do not really conflict with the 
widespread assumption that legal systems are consistent. For instance 
there are many misapplications of the law. The law may still be as-
sumed consistent even though different judges make inconsistent de-
terminations on indistinguishable facts. Most lawyers will argue that 
one of the decisions was simply wrong. By analogy, the system of 
arithmetic is consistent even though some people add wrong. In fact 
the whole system of court appeals is designed to achieve greater levels 
of consistency under the rubric of "correcting errors." Of course not 
all errors are corrected, and inconsistencies remain in fact. This obser-
vation, however, does not undermine the assumption that at least one 
of two inconsistent decisions is wrong.18 Again analogizing to arith-
16. Stone has argued that "the law is consistent and the law must be consistent, just as, and 
in the same way as, and for the same reasons as, mathematics and logic must be consistent." 
Stone-de Montpensier, supra note 12, at 1015. We do not argue that law, mathematics and logic 
"must" be consistent. But if one assumes consistency in logic or mathematics then one inevitably 
encounters true statements which cannot be derived. One cannot exist without the other. 
17. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 27, 73-74. 
18. See id. at 279-90. 
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metic, even though some addition errors are never caught, wrong sums 
are still wrong. 
But often, one might argue, there are inconsistent results in cases 
each decided "rightly," for instance in different jurisdictions, or at dif-
ferent points in history. Contributory negligence may be an absolute 
bar to recovery for negligence in Virginia but not in Ohio. State sales 
tax may have been deductible from income for federal income tax pur-
poses several years ago, but not today. Such "inconsistencies" trouble 
us little, however. The very fact of the difference in jurisdiction or the 
difference in time reconciles the results. In the case of the different 
jurisdictions, the different results are but consistent applications of the 
higher rule (metarule) that a state through its governmental institu-
tions should be able to determine its own tort law. In the case of the 
different points in time, the different results are but consistent applica-
tions of the higher law (metarule) that Congress can modify income 
tax liability from year to year. 
Of course, seeming inconsistencies in the law may make it difficult 
to determine whether one of two rules is simply wrong, or whether 
some relevant distinctions (like differences in jurisdiction) render the 
rules consistent. When the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution 
in a way apparently different from how it has done so before, for ex-
ample, those who defend the new decision argue either that the previ-
ous decisions were wrong or that the new decision is consistent with 
the previous decisions, perhaps because of changed circumstances.19 
Each possibility is in any event consistent with the assumption that 
rules of law in the legal system must be consistent. 20 
Finally, at times the law may not require one action or decision 
only, but instead permits a particular range of choices. The actor or 
decisionmaker in this situation is said to have discretion.21 When dis-
cretion is exercised in different ways on identical facts, a host of issues 
19. Even when the Supreme Court has given solely prospective effect to a new constitutional 
decision, articulable distinctions can render consistent the different treatment of activity before 
and after the new decision. George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1263, 1272-80 (1985). 
20. For a contrary argument, see PETER SUBER, THE p ARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT 295-
96 (1990). Suber accepts some contradiction in the law in order to validate constitutional self-
amendment, in the face of arguments that such self-amendment is inherently contradictory. See 
Alf Ross, On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 MIND 1 (1969). Suber is then 
forced to rationalize as to when the law requires consistency and when it does not. SUBER, supra, 
at 296-303. This is the weakest part of Suber's otherwise rigorous analysis. While a detailed 
critique of Suber is beyond the scope of this article, we suggest that a sounder response to Ross 
could be made by relying upon a precise and limited definition of consistency to avoid the contra-
diction Ross asserted. 
21. See generally John M. Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency ''Discretion," 57 TuL. L. REV. 
776, 776-80 (1983). 
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involving "consistency" arises. 22 But unless discretion is legally nar-
rowed by previous decisions within the range of choices, there is still 
legal consistency even when indistinguishable facts yield different re-
sults. This results from the very fact that the law permits a range of 
choices.23 
III. PAYING ATIENTION TO LEVELS 
A. Language and Metalanguage in the Law 
The law can thus be considered as a system of consistent state-
ments. Can law also serve as its own metalanguage? A positive an-
swer seems to result inescapably from the need for rules to determine 
whether particular well-formed statements are rules of law. Just as 
arithmetic contains statements about numbers that are not only unde-
rivable but also false, many properly formed statements of law are in-
accurate (we might say false) statements - statements that are merely 
in the proper form. For instance: if anyone fails to pay assessed truces, 
he will be hanged. Which statements out of the set of all properly 
formed statements are rules oflaw? To determine this, we need some-
thing analogous to the rucioms and rules of number theory used to 
determine which theorems are "true." 
What we have are rules for creating rules of law. These are more 
frequently called procedures or processes, but because we can put 
them in the form of statements of law, they can be called rules as 
well.24 For instance, a rule for creating a rule might be: if a majority 
of both legislative houses votes for a true law, and the chief executive 
does not veto the bill, the true will be the law. Another might be: ifthe 
Supreme Court finds the true to be excessive, the true will not apply. 
Thus we have law serving as its own metalanguage. 
We can keep going. How do we determine which rules for creating 
rules are true, and which are false? Again, we have rules for making 
this determination. For instance: if the state constitution says that the 
chief executive has the power to veto legislation, then no bill shall be-
22. See John E. Coons, Consistency, 15 CAL. L. REv. 59 (1987). 
23. The logical analogy would be "If x; then Y or Z" Both "X and Y" and "X and Z" are 
consistent with each other - as long as "X and Y" does not imply "If x; then not Z" Stated in 
legal terms, ifthe law truly permits Yor Z result whenever there is factX. then Z result on factX 
is legally consistent with Y result on fact X 
Other definitions of consistency may lead to other types of "inconsistent law." See SUDER, 
supra note 20, at 170-73. 
24. H.L.A. Hart calls them "secondary rules" and categorizes them as rules of recognition, 
rules of change, and rules of adjudication. See HART, supra note 14, at 77-96. Professor Franck 
refers to rules about rules as "secondary rules of process." See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy 
in the International System, 82 AM. J. INTL. L. 705, 752 (1988). Professor Ross refers to "rules 
of competence." See Ross, supra note 20, at 1-2. 
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come law without his or her signature. Then how do we determine 
who will interpret the constitution, or indeed which constitution to 
interpret? If we keep stepping back, we will find rules determined by 
rules determined by rules determined by rules and so on. 25 Where will 
it stop? Who provides the ultimate axioms?26 Before looking for an 
answer, it may be helpful to examine a realistic example to show that 
viewing law as a hierarchical system of rules and metarules is not only 
descriptively accurate, but it also helps us to think clearly about at 
least some difficult legal issues. 
B. United States v. Nixon 
A case that involved a potential conflict of fundamental constitu-
tional power illustrates the hierarchical nature of legal rule determina-
tion, while helping to suggest the source of the ultimate axiom(s). 
United States v. Nixon 27 presented the issue of whether the President 
had to comply with a court-ordered subpoena duces tecum directing 
him to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to con-
versations with aides and advisers. The constitutional law teacher 
might ask a student as Question 1, "Are the President's communica-
tions privileged in the context presented by the case?" The trial 
court's answer, affirmed by the Supreme Court, is no. 
Question 2 is "Who decides Question 1 ?" In other words, does the 
Constitution give the President an absolute privilege, determined by 
himself, or can the court determine that the President should not have 
the privilege in some cases? The President argued that his privilege 
was absolute under the Constitution; the Supreme Court disagreed. 
Question 3 is "Who decides Question 2?" In other words, who has 
the power to make a final determination of the meaning of the Consti-
tution? The answer is the Supreme Court, at least where the case is 
justiciable. The question was apparently settled long ago in the fa-
mous case of Marbury v. Madison. 28 President Nixon could not really 
be accused of having challenged this accepted principle; his lawyers 
did not do so. Indeed, that they litigated the case in the Supreme 
Court amounted to an acceptance of the Supreme Court's power to 
25. For an engaging discussion of these levels, see Stuart Banner, Please Don't Read This 
Title, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 245-46, 249-56 (1989); see also Farago, supra note 11, at 205-06. 
26. According to Alf Ross, "the series of authorities cannot be infinite,'' and therefore there 
must be a "highest authority whose competence is not derived from any other authority." Ross, 
supra note 20, at 2. 
27. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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decide. Such an accusation would have mixed levels by confusing 
Question 2 with Question 3. 
The really interesting question is Question 4: "Who decides Ques-
tion 3?" In other words, what is to keep other branches from them-
selves asserting the final power to interpret the Constitution? We can 
only answer this question by asking what would happen if such an 
assertion were made in a particular case. The people with true power 
would support one side or the other. The people who would ulti-
mately support or repress a revolution, and win, are the operative 
American polity. Stated another way, the polity is the American peo-
ple exercising power individually and collectively through their vari-
ous private and public institutions. 29 
The real genius of Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury was 
that he decided his Question 2 in favor of the political interests that 
then controlled the other two branches of government. The Demo-
crat-Republican Jefferson had just been elected to succeed the Federal-
ist Adams as President, and a Federalist appointee to a judgeship 
(Marbury) sought to obtain his commission from the new Democrat-
Republican Secretary of State (Madison). Chief Justice Marshall (a 
Federalist and Madison's predecessor as Secretary of State) held that 
the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction in that case because the statute 
granting jurisdiction was unconstitutional. Because the Court ruled in 
favor of the politically dominant Jeffersonians, it was impossible for 
the President or Congress to refuse to comply. Chief Justice Marshall 
thereby resolved Question 3 in favor of the Supreme Court. This reso-
lution, effectively unchallenged, was accepted by the people and their 
institutions. Because the polity accepts this, no President would dare 
violate a Supreme Court's clear order. Impeachment, perhaps rebel-
lion, stands in his way. But if the polity were to accept a President's 
(or Congress') authority to interpret the Constitution differently from 
the Supreme Court, then we would simply have a different constitu-
tional system. 
In theory we could keep stepping to higher levels, and never stop. 
Who tells the polity what to do?3° Fortunately it is unnecessary to 
29. To refer to the polity simply as "the people" would be a little misleading, since a bare 
majority of the population might not have the wherewithal to change a ruling power with which 
they disagreed. Those with the determination, ingenuity, funds, numbers, and other resources 
sufficient to change or retain ruling power ultimately determine whether a constitutional system 
will remain or change. 
For example, a dictatorship can have a constitutional system of law, and until it is over-
thrown, we may say that the polity of the country has acquiesced in the dictatorship. But we 
would be reluctant to say that a majority of the people necessarily supports the dictatorial consti-
tutional system. 
30. The same question could perhaps be stated, "What makes the polity's acceptance of law 
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continue to provide the answer, and it would be difficult in any event 
to obtain agreement. Common ground may be possible, however, as 
to the ultimate nature of law. At least in some sense it reflects human 
reasoning. The idea that law exists "out there," not promulgated by 
humans but discovered by them, sounds passe, a sort ofpre-Holmesian 
myth that modern legal thinking has outgrown. We think instead of 
laws that govern human behavior as coming ultimately from people -
rulers, legislatures, courts. Even law based upon custom presumably 
reflects antecedent human decisions as to what behavior is required. 
To the extent that law does in fact reflect the reasoning of man, we 
should be able to use knowledge about the way in which people think 
to help ascertain the nature of law and to examine the limits of law. 
C. Legal Fallacies Analogous to the Confusion of Language and 
Metalanguage 
Some legal confusion is highly analogous to the mixture of levels 
found in Richard's Paradox. Consider for example, the problem of 
revising the U.S. Constitution. Under Article V, two thirds of the 
states may call for a constitutional convention. Cries of alarm have 
risen when that number recently was approached,31 based primarily 
on fears that such a convention would produce a document signifi-
cantly different from our present Constitution. 32 Reassurance should 
come, however, from the Article V requirement that the product of 
such a convention must have subsequent ratification by the legislatures 
of, or conventions in, three fourths of the states; this would be an ex-
traordinary burden for any drastic change to shoulder.33 
A typical response to this reassurance, however, is to point out 
that the present Constitution superseded the Articles of Confederation 
without going through the amendment procedures required by the Ar-
ticles. 34 What is to keep the new convention from providing its own 
procedures for putting the new constitution into effect, without regard 
to the limits of the present Constitution, just as the present Constitu-
tion did without regard to the limits of the Articles of Confederation? 
Stated another way, the question is whether it is the law that the 
determinative?" Peter Suber's treatment of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law deals with the 
possible paradox of saying acceptance makes acceptance determinative. SUBER, supra note 20, at 
65-72. 
31. See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP 73-89 (1988). 
32. Id. at vii-viii. 
33. See PAUL J. WEBER & BARBARA A. PERRY, UNFOUNDED FEARS 8, 117, 119 (1989). 
34. See CAPLAN, supra note 31, at 141-42. Actually, this point is debatable, although most 
writers take the position that the present Constitution cannot be viewed as an amendment of the 
Articles of Confederation. See SUBER, supra note 20, at 327-30. 
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Constitution cannot be changed without subsequent approval by the 
legislatures of three fourths of the States. 35 The answer requires us to 
step outside of the system. To what extent does the polity, the ulti-
mate determiner of the Constitution, give the Constitution the power 
to limit its own change?36 In this case, one might strongly argue that 
the polity of this nation, after 200 years, demands compliance with the 
present Constitution far more than the polity of the United States of 
the 1780s demanded compliance with the Articles of Confederation. 37 
In effect, a bloodless revolution occurred during the period of the 
adoption of the present Constitution, as the polity accepted the new 
one and rejected the Articles. 
Conceivably there will be such a bloodless revolution - contrary 
to the present Constitution - in connection with a new constitutional 
convention. 38 But it is also conceivable that any group of people could 
gather and propose a new U.S. Constitution,39 and that .it would 
"catch on." The American polity's acceptance of the present Consti-
tution as the law of the land prevents such a result, 40 and there is no 
reason to expect the present Constitution not to bind in this respect 
any less than in the other respects in which we have accepted it over 
the past 200 years. 
Careful attention to levels may also help us to defend against at-
tacks on the legitimacy of the constitutional system we have. One 
such attack involves the alleged indeterminacy of judicial determina-
tions: constitutional interpretation cannot be "determined," and in 
particular it cannot be determined by the original intent of the Fram-
ers. The indeterminacy attack thus requires a rejection of interpretiv-
ism - the idea that judges can and should decide constitutional cases 
in accordance with the Framers' intent. The asserted indeterminacy 
35. Professor Suber has examined this very question at extraordinary length, thereby bring-
ing to light remarkable insights about the nature of constitutional systems. SUBER, supra note 
20; see also Norbert Hoerster, On Alf Ross's Alleged Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 81 MIND 422 
(1972); Joseph Raz, Professor A. Ross and Some Legal Puzzles, 81 MIND 415 (1972); Ross, supra 
note 20. 
36. See SUBER, supra note 20, at 49-72; Ross, supra note 20, at 4, 21-24. 
37. See CAPLAN, supra note 31, at 142-46; WEBER & PERRY, supra note 33, at 14-29. 
38. In Kentucky, for instance, the state legislature provided for a referendum on a constitu-
tion prepared by a Constitution Revision Assembly. The procedure did not follow the procedure 
for amendment provided in the current state constitution. The highest court of the state none· 
theless upheld the procedure, reasoning that the state constitutional procedures for amendment 
were not exclusive, but also recognizing that "(w]hen the people vote on the proposed Constitu-
tion it will be an expression of the inalienable right of the ultimate sovereign to reform the gov-
ernment." Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.\V.2d 716, 721-22 (Ky. 1966). 
39. Some are described by SUBER, supra note 20, at 330-31. 
40. \Ve assume that the very process of instituting a constitutional convention would not 
materially alter the polity's support of the current Constitution because the convention would be 
created pursuant to that very Constitution. 
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can be used as a weapon to undermine the consensus of the American 
polity about the limited role of courts in our constitutional system.41 
Put very simply, the idea is that courts are not really constrained by 
the "law," so why not accept the judiciary as a political branch just 
like the legislature or the executive? Careful attention to levels shows 
the fallacy of at least some of these arguments. 
Mark Tushnet, for instance, criticizes interpretivism on the ground 
that the theory is conceptually unable to provide the constraints on 
potential judicial tyranny that its advocates claim it offers.42 Under 
the "liberal" view, the advantage of interpretivism is that unelected 
judges will be unable to construe the Constitution to say whatever they 
want, and thereby possibly abuse power, because they will be con-
strained by the meaning of the Constitution attributable to the Fram-
ers.43 Tushnet argues that' in order to figure out what the Framers 
really intended, we must make assumptions about how a present day 
situation would have been treated in the past. Because it is not readily 
apparent which portions of the Framers' world view to "modernize," a 
degree of indeterminacy affects the interpretive endeavor: 
The first step is an argument that interpretivism must rest on an account 
of historical knowledge more subtle than the naive presumption that past 
attitudes and intentions are directly accessible to present understanding. 
The second step identifies the most plausible such account, the view -
sometimes called hermeneutics - that historical understanding requires 
an imaginative transposition of former world views into the categories of 
our own .... The project of imaginative transposition can be carried 
through in a number of different ways, with a number of different results, 
none of which is more "correct" than the others.44 
This indeterminacy is said to undermine the "liberal" goal of confining 
the power of the unelected branch. According to Tushnet, if there is 
no determinacy there is no substantial constraint: "The existence of 
such an indeterminacy means that interpretivism, unless it falls back 
on nonliberal assumptions, cannot constrain judges sufficiently to 
carry out the liberal project of avoiding judicial tyranny."45 Stated 
41. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism 
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). Other examples are collected in Ken 
Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283, 302 n.67 (1989); see also Paul Brest, Interpre-
tation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982); Arthur S. Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" 
Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 633, 650-53 (1983). See generally Kress, supra; John B. 
McArthur, Abandoning the Constitution: The New Wave in Constitutional Theory, 59 TuL. L. 
REv. 280, 298-99 (1984). 
42. Tushnet, supra note 41, at 793. 
43. E.g .. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
44. Tushnet, supra note 41, at 793; see also id. at 801 ("[T]he need to identify functional 
equivalents over time necessarily imports significant indeterminacy .••. "). 
45. Id. at 793. 
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more strongly, "[t]he interpretivists' premise of determinate intentions 
is essential to their project of developing constraints on judges."46 
Attention to the distinction between rules and metarules exposes 
the fallacy in this line of argument. Choice at one level does not con-
strain choice at a conceptually distinct level. The problem with 
Tushnet's argument is its assumption that no significant constraint can 
exist without determinacy.- It is not true, generally, that judges are 
without constraint if the law permits more than one conclusion. As 
we have seen, a law can permit a range of results and still provide 
constraints. This happens frequently when agencies exercise discre-
tion, or when judges apply different sentences for similar conduct. No 
one would argue that a denial of all discretion is required to put any 
significant restraints on judges. 
Why should it be any different at the level of constitutional inter-
pretation? If interpretivism is indeterminate - that is, if the interpre-
tive endeavor may lead to one of several possible results - it does not 
follow that any result is possible. If an interpretive technique is suffi-
ciently indeterminate to permit ten or twelve interpretations of a par-
ticular clause, that still leaves millions of interpretations that are not 
permitted. Surely it is consistent with the project of liberal constitu-
tional theory to preclude those millions.47 
Now suppose we ask what the rule is for determining whether a 
constitutional rule of interpretation (interpretivism) is a rule of law. 
As the answer, we have posited the following rule about a rule about 
rules: what the polity is willing to accept determines how the Supreme 
Court interprets the Constitution. In other words, the interpretivist 
would argue that the polity does (or should) impose on the Court the 
requirement to interpret the Constitution according to the intent of 
the Framers. That requirement may permit the Court to exercise dis-
cretion (by choosing one of the results permitted by the hermeneutic 
endeavor), but the polity will not permit the Court to come to conclu-
sions outside the range of those choices. 48 Thus the "indeterminacy" 
46. Id. at 800. 
47. None of this demonstrates that interpretivism is the law, but only that it could logically 
and consistently be the law even though indeterminate. 
48. Tushnet's critique of neutral principles founders on the same rock. Neutral principles 
theory requires that judges decide cases on the basis of general principles applied consistently in 
all similar cases. Because there is frequently more than one way to justify a case, a consistency 
requirement will not determine absolutely how a subsequent case will be resolved. Thus, the 
requirement of consistency is not always determinate: "[T]here are always a number of justifica· 
tory principles available to make sense of case I and a number of techniques to select the 'true' 
basis of case I." Tushnet, supra note 41, at 811. 
Assuming this is so, it simply does not follow that a neutral principles requirement provides 
no constraint on judges. The analogy to agency or judicial discretion again is helpful. Thinking 
of the rule for determining whether a constitutional rule of interpretation (in this case neutral 
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criticism of interpretivism (and of neutral principles) simply fails ade-
quately to distinguish indeterminacy from absence of constraint. 
In both examples - the constitutional convention and the inter-
pretivism critique - the failure to recognize levels is highly analogous 
to Richard's failure to distinguish between language and 
metalanguage. 49 The need for ratification by three fourths of the states 
as a requirement at the constitutional interpretation level is not under-
mined by the fact that such ratification is not binding upon the polity 
that accepts and thereby determines what the constitution shall be -
a conceptually higher level. And the possibility that a constitutional 
system that permits a range of choices (interpretivism) can actually be 
the choice of the polity (at a conceptually higher level) does not under-
mine the validity of the choice. 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE INHERENT INCOMPLETENESS 
OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 
We have a somewhat deeper point to make. Godel demonstrated 
that within certain systems, a language could serve as its own 
metalanguage. Godel showed how to construct an arithmetical 
formula G that represented the metamathematical statement: "The 
formula G is not demonstrable."50 Godel proved G metamathemati-
cally (i.e., outside the system), thereby proving that true statement G 
could not be reached within the system. Because this is so, such sys-
tems are not complete. If a system is sufficiently complex to permit 
self-description, and the system is consistent,51 then G can always be 
constructed, and the system is incomplete. 
We have already seen that statements about the law can be in the 
form of laws. The parallel to Godel's proof will be complete if we can 
determine that legal rules are expressive enough to refer to themselves. 
The true insight of Godel's proof was his ability to demonstrate that 
propositions of number theory could be made to refer to themselves. 
principles) is a rule of law, again we can posit: what the polity is willing to accept determines 
how the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution. In other words, the neutral principles advo-
cate would argue that the polity imposes on the Court the requirement to interpret the Constitu-
tion according to neutral principles. That requirement may permit the Court to exercise 
discretion (by choosing one of the results permitted by a neutral principle), but the polity will not 
permit the Court to come to conclusions outside the range of those choices - conclusions that 
no neutral principle can justify. So it is not true that "[n]eutral application requires that we be 
able to identify the principle that justified the result in case I in order to be sure that it is neutrally 
applied in case 2." Id. (Once again, this does not demonstrate that neutral principles is the law, 
but only that it could logically and consistently be the law even though indeterminate.). 
49. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
50. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 85. 
51. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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It is in fact far easier to conclude that legal rules can be self-referen-
tial. 52 We have already seen that statements about the law can be in 
the form of law. The following examples not only demonstrate the 
possibility of legal self-reference, but also suggest the Godelian uncer-
tainty that can occur when there is such self-reference. 
A. Self-proving Rules 
First of all, in some situations a proviso or an exception to a rule is 
stated in self-referential terms. For instance, a legal rule like "All resi-
dents except university students must pay a six percent sales tax" 
sometimes appears in the form, "All residents must pay a six percent 
sales tax, but this provision does not apply to university students." 
Such self-reference is generally effective, 53 and raises only esoteric the-
oretical problems. 54 
For example, Section 6 of the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution states: "This article shall be inoperative unless it shall 
have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legisla-
tures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the 
date of its submission."55 For many reasons, this sentence may not be 
operative- that is, it may not state a rule oflaw. It may be contained 
in an amendment that has merely been suggested by a newspaper edi-
tor. Or if the sentence is in an amendment proposed by a member of 
Congress, it may not have obtained a two-thirds majority in both 
Houses of Congress, or may otherwise have failed to meet the Article 
V requirements for amending the Constitution. In these circum-
stances the sentence is accurate regardless of whether three fourths of 
52. Professor Farago easily concludes that law is complex enough to include arithmetic. See 
Farago, supra note 11, at 226-27. He also explains why legal systems are not reducible to a finite 
recursive process, and that they are thus not able in that way to "escape the consequences of a 
legal GOdel." Id. at 228. 
Farago, however, finds something like a way out of the Gooelian legal uncertainty: intracta· 
ble cases can be decided by the exercise of judicial discretion. Id. at 236-39. The trouble with 
this escape is that it amounts to another metarule, one that is just as vulnerable as any other to 
destructive self-reference if there is no meta-metarule. For example, can a judge decide whether 
a judge cannot exercise discretion to decide an "intractable" case? See Banner, supra note 25, at 
246-47. 
53. This is because every possible hypothesis about whether such a self-referential rule is a 
rule of law or not leads to the conclusion that the rule is a rule of law. In logic, an analogous 
statement would be, "This statement is either true or false." If the statement is assumed true, 
then of course it is true. But even if the statement were assumed for the moment to be false, by 
its terms we would be led to the conclusion that it is nonetheless true. So the statement must be 
true. 
54. See SUBER, supra note 20, at 190-93 (considering the paradoxical nature of "self-repeal· 
ing" laws). 
55. U.S. CoNST. amend. XX, § 6. 
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the States have ratified the amendment within seven years. The 
amendment is simply inoperative. 
If, on the other hand, the external requirements for operability (the 
Article V requirements) are met, two possibilities exist: three-fourths 
ratification occurred within seven years, or it took longer than seven 
years. If the former, then the amendment is operative and Section 6 
accurately states the law (since the conditions for inoperativeness are 
not met). If the latter, then by virtue of Section 6 itself the amendment 
is not operative. Again, Section 6 accurately states the law (since the 
amendment is inoperative when the conditions for inoperativeness are 
met). The self-referential statement makes itself true.56' 
B. Ineffective Bootstrapping 
A different type of self-reference occurs when rules seek to affirm 
themselves. The analogous statement from the realm of logic would 
be, "This statement is true." How do we know whether the statement 
is true? Assume for the moment that the statement is true, then by its 
terms it is true. But if we assume for the moment that the statement is 
false, then it is stating something that by assumption is not true, and 
therefore the statement is false. The statement thus tells us nothing 
more about whether it is true or false than we already knew. One 
might well ask why such statements are ever made. Yet analogous 
attempts at self-affirmation appear with some frequency in the law. 
In Quern v. Jordan, 51 the Supreme Court decided that state sover-
eign immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment does not pre-
clude a federal court from ordering state officials to send certain 
notices. In doing so the Court stated that 42 U.S.C. section 1983 was 
not intended to override the sovereign immunity of the states. 58 Jus-
tice Brennan, concurring, criticized the majority's conclusion regard-
56. Of course this might not be the result if Article V of the Constitution were different. The 
effect of the self-referential statement may depend on the content of the higher level rules. For 
instance, a different Article V might have an additional sentence that states: "All amendments to 
this Constitution shall have no procedural requirements for passage other than those listed in this 
Article, and any additional such requirements contained in any particular amendment shall be a 
nullity and severable." If this were the case, § 6 of Amendment XX might not be self-proving; 
indeed, it might well not be a rule of law at all, because the amendment would come into effect 
even if it took longer than seven years to get three-fourths ratification. The results of a particular 
self-referential rule can thus be changed by stepping out of the system and changing the higher 
level rules. 
It appears, however, that regardless of how Article V were rewritten, a self-proving statement 
could be constructed. For instance, in the example of the modified Article V, a self-proving rule 
could be constructed if§ 7 were added to the amendment saying, "This amendment shall not be 
operative if any part of this amendment, including this section, is found inoperative." While § 6 
might not be operative, § 7 would be. 
57. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
58. 440 U.S. at 338-41. 
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ing section 1983 as "gratuitous" and "patent[] dicta."59 The majority 
responded in a footnote that it could not see how its statement in the 
text "can be characterized as 'dicta.' " 60 The footnote thus in effect 
said, "and this statement is holding and not dictum." In our judicial 
system where holdings are binding on lower courts in ways that dicta 
are not, is a statement by the Supreme Court any more holding by 
virtue of a statement that "this opinion is holding"? 
If we oversimplify for the moment, and assume that a court makes 
law when it holds something, and does not make law when it engages 
in obiter dictum, then the Court in Quern in effect was trying to say, 
"This opinion is the law.'' But any court, engaging in the most wild 
irrelevancies, could append "and this opinion is the law" and we 
would easily deny that such irrelevancies would bind. In order to 
evaluate the binding nature of the opinion, including the self-referen-
tial statement itself, we have to look at the same factors that determine 
whether the opinion is binding without regard to the self-referential 
statement. The footnote logically adds nothing. 
Of course we could step out of the system and change the rules so 
that the footnote would be effective. For instance, if binding holding 
were redefined to include any matter that a court designates to be 
holding, then the Quern footnote would be of great, perhaps determi-
native, significance. 61 
In actual fact, the rules may be somewhere in between. That is, 
dictum is perhaps not entirely legally irrelevant. To the extent that 
Supreme Court dictum generally has some legal weight, the footnote 
will to that limited extent increase the binding force of what otherwise 
might have been dictum in the text. The counterargument would be 
that the statement in the text already had at least the weight accorded 
to dictum, and additional dictum could add no more. But if the foot-
note dictum somehow makes the statement in the text more like hold-
ing, there is arguably an effect from the footnote. If so, the Court 
arguably could have further bolstered its opinion by adding a footnote 
to its footnote, saying that the original footnote was holding! Then 
footnote could be placed after footnote after footnote, and so on. 
A British version of the problem in Quern occurred in London 
Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council 62 The House of 
Lords found that a decision of the House of Lords upon a question of 
59. 440 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
60. 440 U.S. at 341-42 n.12. 
61. Under the new rules, though, a new self-referential statement that would be ineffective 
could be created. 
62. 1898 App. Cas. 375. 
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law is conclusive and binds the House in subsequent cases, and that an 
erroneous decision can be set right only by an Act of Parliament. 63 
There was little discussion of the logic of this action. Could the House 
of Lords, in a subsequent decision, hold that the House need not be 
bound by erroneous decisions, thus reversing one ruling and paving 
the way for the reversal of another? There would be no contradiction 
in such a ruling, which simply would hold that the earlier holding that 
the House is bound by an erroneous decision itself was erroneous. 64 
The potential absurdities involved in thinking about dictum re-
garding holding can perhaps be brushed away by observing that the 
bottom line is arrived at simply by asking when the court has the 
power to extend its own power by redefining when its decisions are 
binding. As we have seen in the discussion of Marbury, the answer 
must lie in the source of the court's power. When the Supreme Court 
in effect stated that "we have the power to interpret the Constitution," 
it was ultimately the polity's acquiescence that rendered the rule a rule 
of law. In other words, we have to step out of the system to find the 
answer.65 
Thus if we are careful in our attention to levels, we can be comfort-
able with this type of legal self-reference as well. But some examples 
63. 1898 App. Cas. at 381. 
64. The London Street Tramways case was analyzed in Stone·de Montpensier, supra note 12. 
Stone noted that critics of London Street Tramways argued that the decision heaved itself up by 
its own bootstraps and that the arguments were circular. See Stone-de Montpensier, supra note 
12, at 1015. Stone defended the Tramways decision by arguing that an opposite decision (i.e., 
"the decisions of this House are not binding upon the House") would involve a paradox like the 
Epimenides (liar's) paradox: "It seems to me also that Godel's results would also apply, for the 
rule [that House of Lords decisions are not binding], even though concerned with consistency, is 
not provable within the legal system. If it were provable, it would be refutable; since the rule is 
not internally provable, it is irrefutable." Id. 
Stone stuck to his position that the London Street Tramways decision could not have been 
otherwise without being paradoxical, despite a subsequent House of Lords Practice Statement 
that may in effect have amounted to an overruling of Tramways. Roy Stone-de Montpensier, 
Logic and Law: The Precedence of Precedents, 51 MINN. L. REV. 655, 661 (1967). Stone argued 
that the Practice Statement was limited and self-contradictory, and that the holding of London 
Street Tramways was necessary for law to be consistent. Id. at 674. Despite multiple references 
to Godel, Stone argued that "the legal system may be complete and decidable and ... consis-
tent." Id. at 670. 
Stone's argument leads to the conclusion that stare decisis is the only attitude that a court in 
a legal system can adopt. J.C. Hicks, The Liar Paradox in Legal Reasoning, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
275, 288 (1971). One wonders whether Stone would find the American legal system, in which 
the Supreme Court overrules itself upon occasion, to be a true legal system. 
We argue directly to the contrary, that legal systems are inherently incomplete, and that 
identifying Godelian undecidability in a system does not invalidate either the rule or the system 
that can produce it. Such undecidabilities can always be identified in sufficiently expressive con-
sistent systems. 
65. Another example of a self-bolstering rule is a California Evidence Code provision that 
limits the applicability to that very code of a particular rule of interpretation (that statutes in 
derogation of the common law should be interpreted narrowly). Banner, supra note 25, at 244-
45. 
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of legal self-reference lead rather directly to the legal counterpart of 
undecidability. 
C. Tangled Loops of Law 
We have looked at self-referential rules that deny their own appli-
cability on certain conditions and thus are self-proving. We have also 
looked at self-referential rules that seek to affirm themselves, but can 
only be judged by stepping out of the system. Still others rules are 
self-referential in ways that tie themselves into undecidable loops 
analogous to Godel's G. 
Comparable loops exist in the law. Such loops can be disguised in 
a pair of mutually self-referential statements. Consider the following 
two sentences: 
The following statement is false. 
The previous statement is true. 
The familiar conflict oflaw conundrum called renvoi provides an anal-
ogy to this type of hidden, tangled self-reference. If state A's conflict 
of law rules in a particular situation require application of the law of 
state B, including B's conflict of law rules, and state B's conflict of law 
rules in a particular situation require application of the law of state A, 
including A's conflict of law rules, then it is impossible to determine 
whose law to apply.66 It does not follow that no law should be ap-
plied. One of the two rules has to be changed, however, to resolve the 
issue. 
Nevertheless, that an undecidable proposition can be created does 
not undermine the whole idea of a conflict of law system, or even a 
conflict of law system which permits reference to the conflict rules of 
another jurisdiction. 67 Indeed, Godel's theorem at least suggests (and 
by analogy proves) that all systems oflaw permit the construction of 
undecidable propositions. Therefore, if a rule's undecidability under-
mines any legal system in which such a rule is possible, then it is im-
possible to have a legal system. So if our human nature, our ability to 
reason, requires a consistent legal system, we must be willing to admit 
the possibility of undecidable rules. 
66. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS§ 8 cmt. j, illus. 2 (1971). 
67. Hicks suggests that "the whole logical impasse would be avoided" with advantage "by 
.•. regarding all choice-of-law rules as referring to the domestic rules [i.e., the law minus choice-
of-law] of the country concerned." Hicks, supra note 64, at 289. The solution is an example of a 
"Theory of Types" in which all, or certain kinds of, self-referring statements are simply banished 
from the system. Id. at 279-80. Such an answer is intuitively unsatisfying. See HoFsrADTER, 
supra note 10, at 21-23. It is not at all uncommon, for instance, for lawyers to think of and apply 
a conflict-of-law rule that refers to the whole law of a foreign jurisdiction. See REsrATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 8(2) (1971). 
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The law can refer to itself and result in undecidability within the 
system not only in reciprocal situations like that of the renvoi prob-
lem. For instance, consider a statute that states, "This statute cannot 
be reviewed by a court." This statement certainly could be codified 
within the law, so it is well formed. But could it be proved from statu-
tory law? It seems not, since reality tells us that courts sometimes 
review statutes that purport not to be reviewable. On the other hand, 
the statement may well be true. It just cannot be proved. 
An interesting example of such undecidability is found in the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 68 The treaty deals in article 
53 with the question of whether there are some rules of public interna-
tional law from which sovereign states may not derogate by treaty: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a per-
emptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the 
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which 
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character. 69 
Does this article state a rule of law for parties to the Vienna Conven-
tion? First of all, one might argue that the article states a rule of law 
only if the article itself is a peremptory norm. Otherwise, a subsequent 
treaty could merely be inconsistent with article 53 itself, thereby su-
persede article 53, and in doing so render article 53 of no binding ef-
fect. But article 53 might also be interpreted to say that new 
peremptory norms cannot arise by treaty.70 Because the Vienna Con-
vention is a treaty, article 53 might plausibly be read as: "This per-
emptory norm cannot be a peremptory norm." Other interpretations 
of article 53 are also possible, albeit with similar problems, 71 but for 
our purposes it really doesn't matter, because at least the Vienna Con-
68. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
69. Id. at 344. 
70. Otherwise the article seems to contradict itself. How can it be that a peremptory norm 
cannot be derogated from by a treaty, but can be modified by a treaty? See Summary Records of 
the 890th Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Intl. L. Commn. 310, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966 (re-
marks of Mr. Rosenne regarding the commentary to what is now article 53). 
71. The International Law Commission's official commentary to what is now article 53 
states: "As a modification of a [peremptory norm] would today most probably be effected 
through a general multilateral treaty, the Commission thought it desirable to indicate that such a 
treaty would fall outside the scope of the article." International Law Commn., Official Commen-
tary to the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, Article 50 [now Article 53]. 61 AM. J. INTL. L. 
285, 411 (1967). Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock favored retention of this sentence 
in the commentary, however, "[d]espite the apparent logical inconsistency," on the ground that a 
general multilateral treaty could have the effect of amending a peremptory norm "if it gained 
sufficient acceptance by States." Summary Records of 890th Meeting, supra note 70, at 310 (re-
marks of Mr. Waldock). 
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vention could have been written clearly to that effect. 72 
Again, that such an undecidable proposition can exist does not un-
dermine the Vienna Convention, or the idea that there is or ought to 
be an international legal system that includes a law of treaties, or in-
deed the idea that peremptory norms exist. Again by analogy to 
Godel's theorem, under any system it is possible to construct such un-
decidable rules. This is in the very nature of a system of consistently 
generated rules of law. 
D. A Critique of Critiques 
Our proposition is thus that systems or bodies oflaw are inherently 
incomplete in the sense that they contain rules of law that cannot be 
derived within the system. We have tried to provide support for the 
necessary premises for such a conclusion: that the law can be analo-
gized to the systems that Godel examined, that the very word "law" 
implies a requirement of consistency, and that legal rules are suffi-
ciently expressive to serve as their own metalanguage. It follows that 
constitutional systems are by nature incomplete in the sense that some 
law is not derivable through the rules that make up the constitutional 
system. Our point is that this is a characteristic of constitutional sys-
tems, and indeed of legal systems in general, and that it therefore 
serves as no basis for criticism of any particular constitutional 
system.73 
A number of seemingly clever critiques of legal theories ignore this 
reality. One sees the fallacy again and again in varying forms. The 
three examples that we expose here involve critiques of legal positiv-
ism, of interpretivism and neutral principles, and of law and econom-
ics theory. There are others, but these three show the versatility of the 
trick. In each case the target theory is attacked, in effect, for not being 
able to prove itself. 74 
Our first example is Ronald Dworkin's argument against the posi-
tivism of H.L.A. Hart. Dworkin argues that Hart's positivism leads to 
unanswerable questions, whereas Dworkin vigorously asserts that even 
72. For instance, by adding the words, "and not by multilateral treaty." 
73. Professor Suber reaches a somewhat different conclusion in his examination of constitu· 
tional provisions for constitutional amendment: "the logical case that self-amendment is para-
doxical is strong and resists all obvious solutions; but ... law can absorb and tolerate even a real 
... logical paradox because law is what is accepted as law, not a logical system affiicted with 
entangling content." SUBER, supra note 20, at 45. 
74. For a somewhat analogous critique of Stanley Fish's deconstruction, with only passing 
reference to Godel, see Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 
76 GEO. L.J. 37 (1987). 
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hard questions oflaw have answers. 75 As the analogy to Godel sug-
gests, however, to say that all questions of law have answers does not 
lead to the conclusion that such answers are always derivable. 
Dworkin attributes to Hart the thesis that "in every nation which 
has a developed legal system, some social rule or set of social rules 
exists within the community of its judges and legal officials, which 
rules settle the limits of the judge's duty to recognize any other rule or 
principle as law."76 At pains to refute this, Dworkin noted that Hart 
accepts that social rules of recognition may be "uncertain" in some 
cases, so that a social rule "does not settle every issue that might arise 
about what counts as law."77 Dworkin refers to Hart's inquiry about 
whether the English Parliament can bind itself into the future. That 
is, if the "rule of recognition" of England is that whatever Parliament 
enacts is law, what if Parliament enacts a law that limits its own ability 
to repeal the law (i.e., an "entrenching" law)? The rule of recognition 
cannot answer how a court would treat such a law. This uncertainty, 
per Dworkin, undermines Hart's thesis: 
It simply does not fit the concept of a social rule, as Hart uses that con-
cept, to say that a social rule may be uncertain in the sense that Hart 
now has in mind. If judges are in fact divided about what they must do 
if a subsequent Parliament tries to repeal an entrenched rule, then it is 
not uncertain whether any social rule governs that decision; on the con-
trary, it is certain that none does.78 
Dworkin thereby purports to have stated a "counterexample" to the 
thesis that "some social rule always exists that stipulates necessary and 
sufficient conditions for what judges must recognize as law."79 We 
must therefore look elsewhere to find the answers - answers that do 
exist - to constitutional questions. 
In this case the "uncertain" example that Dworkin uses is trans-
parently one of the self-referential problems that can be suggested for 
any rule for determining what the law is. 8° Can Parliament pass a law 
stating, "This law cannot be changed"?81 That Parliament cannot an-
swer this question should now come as no surprise. 82 We might con-
struct a similar example to test whether "Dworkin's rights thesis" is 
75. For the latter point, see RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 119-45 (1985). 
76. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 59-60. 
77. Id. at 61 (referring to HART, supra note 14, at 144). 
78. Id. at 60. 
79. Id. at 62. 
80. Dworkin supposes that the entrenchment clause example is neither extraordinary nor 
rare, but does not support the supposition. Id. at 62. 
81. The problem so stated is remarkably similar to the question of whether the House of 
Lords can bind itself into the future. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
82. This of course does not mean that there is no answer. We must step out of the system to 
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the rule for determining what the law is. 83 
Our second example of failure to recognize this involves the con-
tention that "original intent" should determine constitutional interpre-
tation. Just as it is impossible for Parliament to determine that the 
rule of Parliament is the rule of law, it is also impossible for original 
intent to determine whether original intent is the law. Yet this charac-
teristic of any secondary rule has been used to attack original intent as 
a basis for determining the meaning of constitutions and statutes. 
Such an attack is found in Mark Tushnet's alternative bases for 
rejecting original intent and neutral principles. He argues first that 
neither original intent nor neutral principles could sufficiently limit the 
power of judges to meet the "liberal" goal of individual liberty.84 He 
argues in the alternative, assuming that there is some constraint on 
courts' decisionmaking scope, that such constraint must come from a 
common "underlying societal perspective,"85 "shared conceptions,"86 
"shared societal understandings,"87 a "community of understand-
ing."88 These are unexceptionable descriptions of how the polity ulti-
mately governs the interpretation of the constitution. Tushnet's 
remarkable idea is that if there is in fact a community of understand-
ing, then there is no need to protect individual, out-of-mainstream 
thought: 
[W]e must develop a shared system of meanings to make either interpre-
tivism or neutral principles coherent. But in developing such a system, 
we will destroy the need for constitutional theory, predicated as that 
need is on liberal individualism; the problem identified by Hobbes, 
Locke, and liberal thought in general disappears in a society in which 
such a shared understanding exists. 89 
get the answer, though. The source ought to be whoever gave Parliament the power. Who did? 
We would say the British polity, but others might posit the Queen, or God. 
83. For us to attempt to do so here would potentially subject us to the criticism that the 
example we chose could not really be a product of that system. A Dworkin disciple, for instance, 
could explain how our example did not reflect Dworkin's rights thesis. If we are right about the 
analogy to Godel's theorem, however, we need not construct such an example. We can say with 
confidence that if his system is consistent, such examples exist. 
Professor Farago has demonstrated this in his elaborate and telling criticism of Dworkin's 
argument that all cases have right answers. See John M. Farago, Judicial Cybernetics: The 
Effects of Self-Reference in Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 14 VAL. U. L. REV. 371 (1980). Farago 
nonetheless prefers Dworkin's rights thesis to Hart's positivism, essentially because Dworkin's 
theory leaves fewer cases unanswerable. Id. at 420-23. This does nothing to validate Dworkin's 
incompleteness criticism of Hart, however. 
84. See Tushnet, supra note 41, at 786-821; supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. 
85. Tushnet, supra note 41, at 825. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 826. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 826-27. 
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In other words, for interpretivism or neutral principles to work to pro-
tect individualism, we must have a society in which there is no individ-
ualism to protect. 
It may be sufficient to answer this argument by saying that 
Tushnet is simply mixing levels again. There can be a shared societal 
understanding at the level of the polity, perhaps derived ultimately 
from the way we think, that requires either interpretivism or neutral 
principles, while protecting at the next level down - constitutional 
interpretation - different views present in a mixed or individualistic 
society. Indeed, if every governmental theory to protect minority 
views could be challenged on the ground that the theory itself required 
the absence of minority views (consensus), governmental protection of 
most individual rights would be impossible. 90 
The argument is in reality a version of self-destructive legal self-
reference. Tushnet has in effect ascertained withiri interpretivism and 
90. The interpretivist or the neutral principles advocate might try to avoid the problem by 
refusing to defend this particular undecidable self-referential rule. She might argue in the alter-
native that the polity had created a rule more akin to: "This rule permits disagreement with any 
statement other than this one." Certainly we could have a broad - almost universal - societal 
consensus on certain overriding "constitutional" principles - "first order'' views like tolerance 
of different political, social, religious, and moral views that we could then call "second level" 
views - while contemplating a wide lack of consensus on the second level views. 
One might muster considerable support for this alternative response. The remarkable nature 
of our republic is that our people do, by and large, have a broad consensus on such core funda-
mental constitutional principles, a shared societal understanding that transcends the varied bases 
of widely divergent potential factions. To argue that governmental tolerance of opposing ideas 
requires broad agreement to be effective as a policy certainly does not undermine the very notion 
of tolerance. We just have agreement at one level, and disagreement at another level. 
Similarly, if there is a broad consensus that courts should decide cases in a legally consistent 
fashion, or that courts should follow the intent of the Framers (at some level of abstraction or 
other), it is perfectly consistent to support that consensus for the purpose of protecting differ-
ences on a host of other less fundamental issues. Arguing that such limits on courts are inher-
ently contradictory because there must be either consensus or not-consensus ignores the 
possibility that there is consensus on the first order level on protecting not-consensus at the 
second order level. The irony (to be charitable) is that such an inherent contradiction argument 
helps to destroy the presumably valuable first order consensus. 
That the argument tends to destroy consensus about fundamental societal assumptions re-
garding our Constitution is illustrated by Tushnet's deprecation of answers of judicial nominees 
to questions by Senators. According to him, nominees "ought to know better" than to answer 
"yes" to the questions: "Do you intend to apply the law rather than make it?" and "Will you 
apply the words of the Constitution in the way that the framers intended?" Tushnet, supra note 
41, at 781. But asking such questions is merely one way that the polity imposes its fundamental 
rules upon judges. To suggest that judges should properly answer "no" is in effect to urge the 
polity to modify (one might say give up on) such constraints upon the judiciary. 
These are the intellectual underpinnings of tyranny. If one wanted subtly to wean the Ameri-
can polity away from (relatively) popular control of government, to inure the polity to control of 
the government by an elite, the first thing to do would be to attack general attitudes of the people 
that constrain the role of the least representative branch of government. If the people are willing 
to accept the courts as legislatures, then we can have a constitution in which courts are legisla-
tures, just as we can have a constitution in which an archduke rules if the polity accepts it. In 
contrast, if one wanted to preserve politically responsible government, it would be better to urge 
senators to seek reaffirmation of those constraints the polity may justly impose on judges. 
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neutral principles the possibility of saying, "This rule permits disa-
greement with any statement, including this one." The polity cannot 
impose this rule on the basis of a necessary consensus because then 
disagreement could not exist with respect to this very rule. 
Again, the ability to identify such a statement says nothing about 
the relative merits of a constitutional system in which interpretivism 
or neutral principles is the law. By analogy to Godel, such an un-
decidable statement always appears in any practical legal system. 
Otherwise a consistent system of constitutional law would be 
impossible. 
Our third example of the fallacious use of a self-destruction argu-
ment is Arthur Leff 's otherwise trenchant criticism of law and eco-
nomics theory91 as represented in Richard Posner's Economic Analysis 
of Law. 92 Leff identifies Posner's "most key" passage as a definition of 
efficiency to mean "exploiting economic resources in such a way that 
human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to 
pay for goods and services is maximized."93 Leff characterizes this as 
implying that "you can tell what people want, and how much they 
want it, by seeing what they buy, and how much they pay for it."94 
Leff then outlines a paradox: 
But if one thoroughly accepts the idea that the results people actually 
achieve for themselves are the ones that, among the available alterna-
tives, they wanted to achieve, then one trembles on the edge of a worri-
some paradox. For it is then also possible to state matters this way: 
whatever people achieve for themselves, they perceive it as the best they 
can do. If what they want can be determined only by seeing what they 
"buy," then what they "buy" must (by definition) be what they wanted 
(again, given the available choices).95 
The "paradox" is that our society has created a political process, with 
resulting legislation and administration, that interferes with the mar-
ket, and therefore gets in the way of achieving the very goal, aggregate 
human happiness, that a more market-oriented system would cause.96 
How can society have "bought" a system that does not result in opti-
mum happiness (what society wants), when people's wants are defined 
by what they buy? Leff has thus in effect discerned the following state-
91. Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nomina/ism, 60 VA. L. 
REv. 451 (1974). 
92. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). 
93. Leff, supra note 91, at 462 (quoting POSNER, supra note 92, at 4). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 463. 
96. Id. 
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ment in Posner's scheme: "This rule maximizes what society wants, 
even if society doesn't want this rule." 
It should now be clear that this is but another example of a "tan-
gled loop of law," identifiable in any legal scheme. That Leff has 
found one in law and economics theory does little to undermine that 
theory. Law and economics theory, to put it another way, cannot be 
used to demonstrate law and economics theory, but theories generally 
cannot prove themselves, and it is unfair to demand that they do so. 
To be fair to Leff, it should be noted that he purports to argue not 
that law and economics theory is therefore internally inconsistent, but 
rather that one must step out of the system ("[o]ne needs an extracul-
tural standing place") to evaluate the system's validity.97 Our point, 
though, is that this is no more true, nor damning, for law and econom-
ics theory than for any other. 
None of this is meant to argue affirmatively in favor of Hart's posi-
tivism, or interpretivism, or law and economics theory. We have to be 
careful of clever criticisms, however, that at bottom are not very tell-
ing. In each of these three cases, a legal theory was criticized for fail-
ing to prove itself as a rule within its own system. A key self-
referential statement was identified as "contradictory." It was not re-
ally contradiction, however, but undecidability within the advocated 
legal theory. Finding such an undecidability cannot invalidate a con-
sistent system, however, since every consistent system has one. 
Undecidabilities can of course be very disturbing. It is troubling, 
for instance, that a system of tolerance cannot answer the question 
whether intolerance will be tolerated. But it is simply unfair to criti-
cize a regime of tolerance for its failure to provide an answer to the 
question. The analogy to Godel shows that such a "weakness" is a 
universal characteristic of legal schemes in which the law can refer to 
itself in a meaningful way. 
CONCLUSION 
We can view the law as a hierarchical system of rules that gener-
ates consistent rules of law - analogous to a formal system like logic 
or number theory that generates a set of consistent and true state-
ments. Each is related in some sense to the way we think. To the 
extent that each permits self-reference, and the system of law certainly 
seems to, lessons from the analogy to number theory can be drawn. 
97. Id. at 464. Leif proceeded to do so. He challenged Posner's analysis of the efficiency of 
criminal punishment, for instance, by questioning Posner's assumption that the justification for 
the punishment of criminal violations is deterrence. Id. at 464-66. 
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Careful attention to the hierarchical nature of the legal system can 
resolve certain legal fallacies by distinguishing between language and 
metalanguage. Analogy to Godel's theorem teaches a more funda-
mental lesson: any sufficiently expressive formal system must contain 
undecidable propositions. Identifying such undecidable propositions 
in a constitutional or other legal system cannot undermine that sys-
tem, since any legal system must contain rules that cannot be deter-
mined to be the law or not to be the law. Those who attack 
constitutional systems on grounds that fail to recognize this character-
istic of all legal systems are unfairly criticizing - and indeed under-
mining - such systems. 
